Managing Conflicts of Interests – Ethics Rules and Standards in the Member States and the European Institutions. by Demmke, Christoph & Henökl, Thomas.
EIPASCOPE 2007/3
35
Managing Conflicts
of Interests –
Ethics Rules and Standards
in the Member States and
the European Institutions
By Dr  Dr  Dr  Dr  Dr Christoph Demmke  Christoph Demmke  Christoph Demmke  Christoph Demmke  Christoph Demmke and Thomas Henökl Thomas Henökl Thomas Henökl Thomas Henökl Thomas Henökl*
This article discusses the existing rules and standards for the Holders of Public Office (HPO) as
regards conflicts of interest (CoI) within the Member States of the EU as well as within the EU
institutions. It presents findings from a comparative study for the European Commission, which
analyses and compares the various rules and standards contained in the laws, regulations and
codes of conduct for members of government, elected members of parliament (legislators),
judges of the courts of justice (supreme courts or constitutional courts), and members or directors
of the courts of audit and central or national banks. By conducting exhaustive empirical research
on the ethics systems of the various national and European institutions, in-depth insight into an
extremely complex and politically very sensitive subject could be gained. As can be demonstrated,
current reform processes relating to the field of CoI are leading to new trends and innovations
that can be of great interest for national and the EU institutions which are eager to reform their
policies and instruments.
• increase public confidence in the government;
• demonstrate the high level of integrity of the vast
majority of government officials;
• prevent conflicts of interest from arising because official
activities would be subject to public scrutiny;
• deter persons whose personal finances would not bear
up to public scrutiny from entering public service; and
• better enable the public to judge the performance of
public officials in the light of their outside financial
interests.
Gradually, ethics policies are becoming more important
everywhere. The underlying reasons for this worldwide
development can be summarised as follows:
• First, society is becoming increasingly demanding as to
the behaviour of the Holders of Public Office.
Consequently, potential conflicts of interest may weaken
public trust;
• Second,  new forms of relationships have developed
between the public and private sector, which give rise to
increasingly close forms of collaboration between the
two sectors;
• Third, new forms of mobility between the public and
private sector may provoke more potential conflicts of
interests as regards post-employment issues;
• Fourth, political scandals and increasing media attention
put more pressure on the political actors to do even more
in the field of ethics.
At present, in the field of CoI, two conflicting trends can be
observed. On the one hand, the current development is
towards new transparency requirements1 and the emergence
of new forms of accountability.2 On the other hand, there
is a tendency towards new ethics bureaucracies and the
introduction of measures which have a direct impact (at
least in some countries and institutions) on privacy issues.
Within this context, the trend towards more disclosure
requirements in registers, and the setting up of new
(independent) ethics committees and other monitoring
bodies should also be seen as an ambivalent development.
Unfortunately, there is little knowledge about the impact of
the above-mentioned developments on the effectiveness of
the different ethics regimes and ethics instruments. This is
also partly due to the fact that the monitoring of the registers
and the working procedures of (many internal) ethics
committees are highly intransparent, and because
information is not easily accessible.
The purpose of rules and standards in the field of CoI The purpose of rules and standards in the field of CoI The purpose of rules and standards in the field of CoI The purpose of rules and standards in the field of CoI The purpose of rules and standards in the field of CoI
More and better rules on Conflicts of Interest for Holders of
Public Office should – at least in theory – lead to more trust,
greater accountability, more integrity and less unethical
behaviour and/or corruption. New rules should also provide
a tool for identifying and resolving potential conflicts of
interest, as well as:
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Throughout the last decades, the trend was clearly
toward more rules and regulations in the field of ethics and
conflicts of interests. In the USA and Canada, in particular,
rules and standards of conduct were constantly rising. At
the same time, there is no clear empirical evidence as to
whether conflicts of interest
and corruption are increas-
ing or decreasing. A study by
Mackenzie came to the
following conclusion: “Worry
about the ethics of public
officials greatly exceeds
formal evidence of ethical
violations.”3
Apparently there is a
trade-off between the grow-
ing complexity of our socie-
ties and the need for better,
clearer and stricter rules. Moral and ethical standards are
changing more rapidly than before. In addition, concepts
of conflicts of interest and corruption have changed over
the years to include more types of official and private
conduct. What was legal a generation ago is considered
corrupt today.4 Because of the growing number of ethics
rules and standards, “there are many more laws to be
broken nowadays”.5
Clearly, politicians face different conflicts of interests
than judges or directors of central banks. Moreover, the
media scrutiny is different for judges or directors of banks,
etc. Legislators also face different accountability and
legitimacy challenges. Another important difference between
legislators and other categories of Holders of Public Office
is the fact that, in most countries, the constitution assigns the
parliament the responsibility for the regulation of its
members. Because of this – and this is different to the
situation in the public services – members of parliament
have little interest in monitoring themselves and deciding
upon the setting up of independent ethics committees.
Instead, rules of conflicts of interest for members of
parliament are generally enforced through a system of self-
regulation.
Conflicts of interests may also occur because, in most
countries, legislators decide on essential parts of their own
remuneration. In addition, politicians deliberate on laws
and regulations, on party and election financing as well as
on lobbying issues. Finally, they also legislate on behalf of
their own interests when
defining their own rules and
standards in the field of
conflicts of interest. Further-
more, parliamentary im-
munity is an issue for the
parliament itself. In many
countries, this constitutes a
sensitive issue, since parlia-
mentarians are almost
exempt from any civil or
criminal prosecution. More-
over, enforcing sanctions
implies the starting of time-consuming procedures (whereas
the public may ask for quick responses to political scandals).
Thus, legislators are – at least partly – regulating
themselves. This is problematical, as it raises suspicion and
doubts about independence, fairness, and accountability.
As a consequence, more countries are thinking about the
introduction of external inter-institutional ethics committees
or independent offices. “This is because traditional systems
of self-regulation are more and more discredited. They can
no longer command public confidence.”6 However, trends
differ widely. Whereas many parliaments have, at least,
established different forms of self-regulation, others do not
even have this. In the European Parliament (EP), the
quaestors are responsible for monitoring the ethical conduct
of MEPs. However, to date, little is known about the
modalities of the internal control of ethical standards by the
quaestors.
Since potential conflicts of interest are abundant for
legislators, they need specific rules and standards in the
field of CoI. In addition, they need to be trained on CoI and
must be made aware of (un-) ethical issues. At the same
time, legislators need less rules and standards in specific
fields (such as post-employment, the regulation of political
© European Community, 2007
The current development is
towards new transparency
requirements and the
emergence of new forms of
accountability.
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outside activities, etc.). Thus, clear rules and standards in
the field of gift-taking, nepotism and lobbyism may be very
relevant for this category of HPO.
Rules and standards in the EU institutions Rules and standards in the EU institutions Rules and standards in the EU institutions Rules and standards in the EU institutions Rules and standards in the EU institutions
At present, the EU institutions have entirely different and
separate rules and standards in the field of conflicts of
interests for the Holders of Public Office. By studying the
regulation density amongst the six EU institutions, it can be
seen that the European Investment Bank and the European
Commission occupy the first rank of issues regulated,
followed by the European
Central Bank (ECB) and the
European Court of Auditors
(ECA). The institutions with
the highest number of
unregulated issues are the
European Court of Justice
(ECJ) and the European
Parliament.
Surprisingly to many
observers, most of the
European institutions are
regulated more strictly than
the different institutions at national level. Only some new
Member States have a higher regulation density as regards
the regulation of some CoI issues.
Because of the lack of secondary law, the most important
regulatory instrument of the EU Institutions is codes. In total,
the EU institutions have adopted more than ten different
codes which regulate the different HPO. Thus, the existing
rules and standards for the Court of Justice stem almost
exclusively from existing rules in the Treaty articles and from
the Protocol to the Statute of the Court of Justice. Apart from
these rules, the European Court of Justice had, until
September 2007, no other rules (and no codes) that
governed the behaviour of the Judges and Advocates
General, etc., of the ECJ.
The situation is different for the European Parliament.
With regard to this institution, the European Constitutional
Treaty (ECT) does not contain any rules as to CoI of HPO
in the European Parliament. The existing rules of the EP are
only those that are mentioned in the Rules of Procedure of
the European Parliament (and especially in Annex I). Thus,
because it was not possible to classify the Rules of Procedure
of the EP as a law, we have decided to classify the Rules of
Procedure as a code within the meaning of this study. From
a methodological point of view, this was the only way to
recognise that the EP has specific ethical standards. In
general, however, rules of procedure can not be classified
as codes of ethics.
These codes are very different and range from statements
on governance, codes of good administrative conduct and
codes of conduct, to codes of ethical criteria. In some cases,
there are even differences within one institution. For example,
the Management Committee Code of Conduct in the
European Investment Bank (EIB) differs from the Code of
Conduct for the Members of the Board of Directors of the
EIB. In addition, the Code of Conduct of the European
Central Bank is different to the Code of Conduct for the
Governing Council of the ECB. These few cases show that
each code is designed towards the proper structure of the
organisation in question.
Differences can also be seen as to the length and
content of the different texts. Compared to the codes of the
EIB and the ECB, the code of conduct for the members of
the Court of Auditors is relatively short. Another specific
case is the Statement on Governance of the EIB which
introduces the function of Chief Compliance Officer at the
EIB. No other institution has introduced such a function.
As recently as September 2007, the Court of Justice also
introduced a new code of ethics, which leaves the European
Parliament as the only EU institution without a proper code
of ethics.
Commissioners, for instance, are bound to respect the
duties of independence, impartiality, the duty to behave
with integrity and discretion
as regards the acceptance
of posts, appointments,
benefits, and functions after
they have ceased to hold
office (Article 213 ECT), as
well as the duty of confiden-
tiality (Art. 287 ECT). The
Code of Conduct for Com-
missioners adds that “they
shall refrain from disclosing
what is said at meetings of
the Commission”. Since
different categories of Holders of Office must have specific
ethical standards which are designed for their specific tasks
and duties, it does not seem recommendable to design one
detailed code of ethics for all Holders of Public Office in the
different institutions.
Because of these specific CoI regulations in the different
EU institutions, the other EU institutions should not be used
as simple benchmarks for the EP. However, over the past
fifteen years, the institutional weight of the European
Parliament has increased, and its powers have been
strengthened, especially with the introduction of co-decision
and control rights over the Commission. Therefore, there is
no longer any reason to manage CoI in the EP differently
than in the national parliaments.
Compared to the EU institutions, only few Member
States have established independent ethics committees or
an Office of Government Ethics. At EU level, the EIB has
created the position of an independent compliance officer.
As regards the latter, no (public) evidence that clearly
defines this position and its work in practice actually exists.
Concerning the Commission, it seems questionable
(especially in the light of the institutional architecture
defined by the EC Treaty, Article 217), as to whether it would
be legally possible to establish an Ethics Committee with
sanctioning powers and the authority to decide upon
specific conflicts of interest concerning the EU
Commissioners. Despite these legal restrictions, the existing
Ad hoc Committee has a too limited role. It is only responsible
for post-employment issues. In order to improve the situation,
it should be recommended to establish an ethics committee
with a broader mandate (advising HPO, restricting
monitoring role, public role, etc.).
Registers of interest that are open to the public are a
popular and widely-used instrument in the Member States.
However, in reality, little is known as to the effectiveness of
registers, or about the potential political abuse of public
registers. On the other hand, HPO have access to a great
deal of power and influence. In addition, people are
supposed to place a tremendous amount of trust in HPO.
Therefore, they should also be the subject of public scrutiny
There is no clear empirical
evidence as to whether
conflicts of interest and
corruption are increasing or
decreasing.
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(and not only by being exposed to the voters’ verdict). Thus,
it should be welcomed that the European Court of Justice
has (recently) established a register of interest (which
should be easily accessible to the public). We would also
suggest that the ECJ introduces its own ethics committee
and/or participates in the setting up of an Independent
Standards in Public Office Commission. At present, not all
institutions have credible monitoring and enforcement
mechanisms regarding their registers of interest. In most
cases, the declarations of interest are sent to the president
of the institutions. However, it is questionable as to whether
the office of the president has the necessary means and
resources to “manage” the monitoring of registers. Thus,
this form of self-regulation may lack both credibility and
deterrent effects.
Ethics rules and public trust Ethics rules and public trust Ethics rules and public trust Ethics rules and public trust Ethics rules and public trust
Critics (Anechiarico and Jacobs,7 Mackenzie,8 Stark,9 Saint-
Martin and Thompson,10 Behncke,11 Bovens,12 etc.) argue
that more rules of ethics do not necessarily provide a more
efficient response to the
decline of public trust and
integrity issues, but may
cause even more cynicism
regarding public and politi-
cal institutions. The problem,
critics say, is that the expan-
sion of ethics regulations and
more public discussions
about the need for more and
better (conflicts of interest)
rules have not contributed to
a rise in public confidence in
government. In fact, the calls
for more and better ethics
have the opposite effect. More “ethics regulations and
more ethics enforcers have produced more ethics
investigations and prosecutions.....Whatever the new ethics
regulations may have accomplished...they have done little
to reduce publicity and public controversy about the ethical
behaviour of public officials.”13
Behnke argues that “in spite of the individual rationality
of these strategies, the collective irrationality lies in the fact
that ever more transparency, ever higher standards and
tighter regulations create ever more violations of ethical
rules, more scandals and more investigations, and thus
undermine the legitimacy of the institution, destroy public
trust and create collective costs that far outweigh the
individual benefits. In addition to the individual rationality
leading to collective irrationality, the last element that
makes the situation a real Prisoners’ Dilemma is the fact
that no built-in mechanism can stop this arms race”.14 The
assumption on the part of the legislators and the members
of government who favour the adoption of new rules and
standards is that this will have a positive effect and increase
public trust in government. However, a strong focus on
ethics, too strict an approach, too much publicity and too
many rules may also undermine public trust.
The more rules and standards are introduced, the more
often rules and standards can be violated. Consequently,
media and the public may interpret this as a sign of
declining ethical standards. “Thus, rather than decreasing
the number of cases of unethical behaviour, by declaring
behaviour which was formerly in accordance with the rules
to be unethical, the absolute number of scandals and cases
of unethical behaviour increases, thus creating the
appearance of public officials becoming more unethical. In
reality, however, higher ethical standards lead to an overall
more ethical public service.”15
From a political point of view, it is difficult to be against
new initiatives and new rules in the field. Regulating ethics
policies is popular. On the other hand, ethics policies are
becoming more and more politicised. Ethics is slowly
emerging as a perfect policy field in electoral campaigns.
Politicians can be sure that calls for new initiatives will be
applauded by the citizenry because these calls reflect a
widespread perception in European societies that levels of
corruption and conflicts of interest are increasing and that
something must be done. From the perspective of a Holder
of Public Office, it would be detrimental to be against new
or even higher ethical standards, even more so, since the
call for higher ethical standards and tighter rules of ethics
are increasingly the subject of election campaigns in many
countries.
The downside of this development is that it becomes
increasingly difficult to avoid
ethics – as a policy issue –
being abused (including
media abuse) by way of
moral stigmatisation. This
danger is, indeed, especially
relevant for EU institutions
although (or, even, be-
cause!) they are relatively-
strictly regulated. Ethical
violations in the EU institu-
tions, in particular, are
quickly made public and
enhance the image that the
EU institutions and the
Holders of Public Office (mainly in the European
Commission) are very vulnerable to corruption and CoI. At
national level, too, more and more politicians use
“accusations of unethical conduct as a political weapon...”.16
Rules of ethics, in particular, are resources that politicians
mobilise to attack and discredit their opponents.
Consequently, ethics is increasingly used as a moral
instrument with the aim of denouncing political opponents.
Ethics management as an effective instrument in the Ethics management as an effective instrument in the Ethics management as an effective instrument in the Ethics management as an effective instrument in the Ethics management as an effective instrument in the
fight against corruption fight against corruption fight against corruption fight against corruption fight against corruption
Rules of ethics can only be one instrument in the fight
against corruption, fraud and conflicts of interest. The
reasons for corruption, fraud, etc., are too complex, and
there are too many variables that cause corruption, which
cannot be discussed here. In total, the results of our study
show that particularly many new EU Member States have
introduced very detailed and strict rules in the field of
conflicts of interests. Often, these countries are also those
with a high degree of perceived corruption and fraud. The
adoption of new and stricter measures in these countries is
also a reaction to important real life concerns and problems.
A different question is whether these countries have the
necessary capacities and skills to properly implement,
manage, monitor and enforce the rules which they have
adopted.
Clearly, the existence of strict rules and standards does
not guarantee ethical government. In some of the new
Surprisingly to many
observers, most of the
European institutions are
regulated more strictly than
the different institutions at
national level.
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Member States, in particular, it seems that one of the
objectives of the introduction of strict and detailed rules
(covering all categories of Holders of Public Office) was to
prohibit HPO “from entering into an ever-increasing number
of specified, factually ascertainable sets of circumstances
because they might lead to inner conflict” preventively.17
Another objective was to satisfy the requirements of EU
membership. The situation in some of the new Member
States offers an interesting contrast with the situation in
most Scandinavian countries which have much fewer rules
and standards in place, but, at the same time, relatively low
levels of corruption and bribery.
This supports the hypothesis that more regulations do
not necessarily lead to less corruption. Instead, it seems that
more regulation is not required in those situations or
countries where high levels of public trust exist.
This short analysis allows for two conclusions:
• First, there is no automatic link between strict rules and
a low degree of corruption (and conflicts of interest).
Moreover, a low degree of regulation density may be
perfectly compatible with a low number of conflicts of
interests.
• Second, this is not to say that countries with a high level
of corruption and conflicts of interests should have
fewer rules in place.
Moreover, too many ethics measures can damage the
public trust, instead of enhancing it. This is the case if the
introduction of more rules supports the perception that
these rules were introduced because of the existing high
level of corruption and conflicts of interest. The problem is
that subjective perceptions of increasing levels of conflicts
of interest run the “risk of reflecting the general pre-
dispositions of citizens towards government, rather than
actual experienced corruption.”18
Awareness creating for the existing rules and regulations
constitutes an extremely important aspect of efficient ethics
management. If the number of CoI rules and standards
increases, the effective
implementation of a conflicts
of interest policy will require
the on-going education and
training of all HPO. Natural-
ly, it is quite a challenge to
convince ministers, legis-
lators, judges and directors
to take the necessary time
and to participate in training
courses. The findings of the
conducted research suggest
that training on conflicts of
interest for HPO is highly
under-developed. Many Member States do far too little in
order to make HPO sufficiently aware of the existence of
these rules. In total only 27% of all HPO receive training.
Ideally, HPO should not only be trained in ethics, but
also have (at any time) access to organisational support,
guidelines, advice and other information that will help him/
her to identify and disclose a conflict of interest. In the
Member States, the task of providing advice is mainly
delegated to ethics committees. For example, in Ireland,
the Ethics Commission is explicitly charged with providing
advice to members (and may also maintain a high degree
of confidentiality).
In the United States, the House Committee on Standards
of Official Conduct similarly emphasises education and
counselling. Indeed, an important part of the Committee’s
work “is responding to questions from, and providing
advice to, House Members and staff regarding the laws,
rules and standards that govern their official conduct.
Committee staff are available to provide informal advice
over the telephone, by e-mail, or in person, and the
Committee will provide a formal written opinion in response
to a proper written inquiry”.19 The Committee also distributes
a lengthy House Ethics Manual to assist Members with
interpreting the rules. Another example is Article 7 of the
Code of the European Central Bank which provides advice
on ethical matters to the members of the ECB Council.
These few cases document why ethics committees are
important. They should not only control and monitor CoI,
they should also support and help HPO.
The importance of regulatory quality The importance of regulatory quality The importance of regulatory quality The importance of regulatory quality The importance of regulatory quality
Highly-regulated countries and institutions, in particular,
face the challenge of poor quality of rules, overlapping
rules and a low level of awareness of the existing rules and
standards (which are mainly not codified into one document,
but fragmented over several documents).
For instance, the present trend towards more regulation
of ethical rules in the United States shows that highly
regulated ethics regimes are not necessarily more effective
(and certainly not more efficient) than other less regulated
regimes. However, the tendency towards more regulation
as well as the increased criticism against too many rules is
still very much a US and Canadian phenomenon. Most US
and Canadian officials and legislators point out the potential
negative impact of too tight rules and requirements in
registers as well as over-restrictive post-employment rules
that have negative impact on individual careers, the
attractiveness of top positions in government, and
recruitment and retention policies. As the Canadian Ethics
Commissioner mentioned in his Annual Report (2005): “A
pitfall of this approach is
that a requirement to pro-
vide a more detailed public
disclosure of assets, hold-
ings and corporate interests
may deter well-qualified and
experienced persons from
seeking or accepting public
office because of legitimate
privacy concerns.”20 Another
US study21 in the National
Institute of Health came to
the conclusion that strict
obligations with regard to
the duty to divest financial interests, and prohibitions with
regard to outside activities had a negative impact on the
ability of the different agencies to recruit and retain staff. In
addition, many employees were of the opinion that it would
be better to just enforce the rules better rather than
strengthening them. More than 50% of employees felt that
these rules had a negative impact.
These examples from the US (and partly from Canada)
suggest that European institutions may learn from these
experiences, and thereby avoid too many rules, too much
bureaucracy and too burdensome reporting require-
ments, etc.
Whereas in the USA public
integrity measures tend
to be over-restrictive, this
can not be said for the
majority of the Member
States of the EU.
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Requirements for more transparency and for the
declaration of information, etc., in particular, are supposed
to discipline institutions and office-holders by making
information about their potential conflicts of interest public.
Therefore, transparency positively influences ethical
behaviour because public exposure is presumed to act as
a stimulus: the more the public knows about HPO, the
better they behave. Transparency and openness
requirements are also popular since they are commonly
supposed to make the institutions and their office holders
both more trustworthy and more trusted. Thus, many
experts in the field propose that HPO should be required to
disclose more personal information.
Yet, these suggestions are
not without difficulties, since
public disclosure requires
effective management sy-
stems and may produce
(depending on how strict the
requirements are and how
many HPO are required to
make detailed reports) huge
quantities of information.
Another question is whether
this information – which is
offered for public scrutiny –
is of interest and under-
standable for the wider
public.
Furthermore, in the light of potential conflicts with
privacy rights of HPO, it remains to be seen whether this
trend towards more transparency requirements and
reporting obligations will continue.
Conclusions Conclusions Conclusions Conclusions Conclusions
The comparative analysis of conflict of interest regulation
shows that more rules do not necessarily lead to less CoI
and corruption. Instead, it seems that more regulation is
not required in the situations or countries where high levels
of public trust exist. On the other hand, tough and strict
rules are not a necessary condition for low levels of conflicts
of interest. From this, we can draw the conclusion that there
is also no ideal type of CoI system: the need for different CoI
systems as well as the conditions for their successes and
failures depend – to a large extent – on the particular socio-
cultural environment. Consequently, so-called “high-trust”
countries need different rules and standards than “low-
trust” countries with a high level of corruption. In addition,
regulation as such is only one instrument and does not
solve any problem by itself Therefore, emphasis should
always be put on the need for an integrity-infrastructure
which consists of a pro-active approach towards CoI (and
ethics in general) including a combination of awareness-
raising instruments (including leadership) transparency
policies, rules and standards, as well as deterrent measures.
Generally speaking, there is no evidence that conflicts
of interests are increasing as such. Therefore, asking for the
introduction of more and stricter rules would send the
wrong signal and would (possibly) be even counter-
productive. Moreover, conflicts of interest include many
different situations. Whereas some issues (for example,
post-employment) deserve more attention and better rules
and standards, other issues (for example, gift policies) are
generally well managed. Therefore, we recommend that
new policies should be designed diligently, and only after
having carried out a careful cost-benefit analysis.
Whereas in the US public integrity measures tend to be
over-restrictive, this can not be said for the majority of the
Member States of the EU. However, the present trend in
many Member States seems to point towards the regulation
of an ever-increasing number of issues. At present, this is
particularly the case in the
new Member States. How-
ever, as this study shows,
too many and too restrictive
rules may have a parad-
oxical effect. Another chal-
lenge is the implementation
and the enforcement of the
rules in practice. Whereas a
certain minimal set of rules
is absolutely needed, too
many and too tight restric-
tions and prohibitions can
be costly, bureaucratic, and
potentially even ineffective.
Therefore, we recommend
a finely-balanced approach between risk and regulation.
In particular (some of) the new Member States should move
away from the concentration on more regulatory activity.
Instead, these countries would be well-advised to focus on
implementation and enforcement issues.
Despite these warnings against over-regulation, the
undertaken research also shows that some CoI issues may
be under-regulated in some institutions and EU Member
States. The findings do not confirm that all governments
and institutions are aware of the potential risks of conflicts
of interest as a result of the Holders of Public Office leaving
public office. In fact, our comparative analysis of conflicts
of interest issues has shown that post-employment is the
least regulated CoI issue of all. This may be problematical
since leaving the position (because of a career stop,
retirement, stepping down, ending the appointment, etc.)
raises legitimate questions about the future use of the
special knowledge and insight of former Holders of Public
Office. Holders of Public Office have unique and important
(and often confidential) inside information which is sensitive
and can produce an unfair advantage over competitors.
Suspicion of impropriety, such as the potential misuse of
“insider information”22 for the illicit benefit of former
Holders of public office is a widely-shared concern across
most EU countries (and also within most EU institutions).
Clearly, the future challenge lies in balancing issues such
as the need to avoid conflicts of interests with the protection
of privacy rights and the need to ascertain the attractiveness
of public sector employment.
Despite warnings against
over-regulation, the
undertaken research also
shows that some CoI issues
may be under-regulated in
some institutions and EU
Member States.
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